Ukraine drones: named systems in the Russia–Ukraine war
The Russia–Ukraine war is the clearest modern example of drones operating at industrial scale across reconnaissance, artillery support, one-way attack, heavy-bomber, FPV, and counter-UAS roles.
What drones are documented here?
Public evidence covers both imported systems and rapidly changing domestic Ukrainian platforms. Named-system pages should be separated from the much larger universe of generic FPV and commercial-adapted drones.
| Drone | Manufacturer | Role | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shahed-136 / Geran-2 Shahed-136 · Geran-2 | Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); Russian production under the Geran-2 name | One-way attack UAV used for long-range strike missions. | Confirmed system use |
| Shahed-131 / Geran-1 Shahed-131 · Geran-1 | Iranian defense industry; Russian production relationship publicly documented | Smaller one-way attack UAV used in Russia’s long-range strike campaign. | Confirmed system use |
| Shahed-238 / Geran-3 Shahed-238 · Geran-3 | Shahed Aviation Industries (Iran); Russian production under the Geran-3 designation | One-way attack UAV used for long-range strike missions. | Reported attribution |
| Geran-4 / Geran-5 Geran-4 · Geran-5 | Russian production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Tatarstan; engines identified by Ukrainian intelligence as Chinese | Jet-powered one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems designed for deep strikes and high-speed penetration against air-defense networks. | Reported attribution |
| Mohajer-6 Mohajer 6 | Iranian defense industry | Reusable armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance UAV. | Confirmed system use |
| Bayraktar TB2 TB2 · Bayraktar | Baykar | Medium-altitude long-endurance armed ISR UAV. | Confirmed system use |
| ZALA Lancet Lancet-3 · Item 51 · Item 52 | ZALA Aero Group, part of Kalashnikov Concern | Reconnaissance-linked loitering munition for precision attack missions. | Confirmed system use |
| Orlan-10 Orlan 10 | Special Technology Center (STC) and associated Russian suppliers | Catapult-launched reconnaissance and artillery-observation UAV. | Confirmed system use |
| Vampire / Baba Yaga Vampire UAS · Baba Yaga | Ukrainian defense manufacturer; company name not disclosed in the cited Ministry of Defence page | Heavy multirotor UAS used for battlefield delivery, support, and strike missions. | Confirmed system use |
| LITAVR interceptor LITAVR · F-Drones interceptor | F-Drones | Counter-UAS interceptor designed to engage Shahed-type UAVs and other aerial targets. | Confirmed system use |
| Octopus interceptor Octopus UAV interceptor | Ukrainian defense industry consortium; four contracted manufacturers are named by the Ministry of Defence, but not identified on the cited page | Interceptor UAV for countering Shahed-type attack drones. | Confirmed system use |
| Molniya Molniya-1 · Molniya-2 · Molniya-2R | Atlant Aero LLC (Russia) | Low-cost fixed-wing one-way attack and reconnaissance drone assembled from plywood, aluminium tubes, and commercial electronics for frontline strikes. | Reported attribution |
| Blyskavka Blyskavka drone · Блискавка | Disputed: Vyriy Drone per Militarnyi and Ukrainska Pravda (2025 to May 2026, incl. Euromaidan Press); a standalone Blyskavka company per UNITED24 Media and blyskavka.tech (2026) | Catapult-launched fixed-wing strike drone derived from the Russian Molniya airframe, built to carry an eight to nine kilogram warhead into frontline positions and armour. | Reported attribution |
| Thor Hammer SkyFall Thor Hammer | SkyFall (Ukraine) | Fixed-wing one-way strike drone that SkyFall says carries a 40 to 50 kg warhead up to 350 km or 600 km. SkyFall says an operator confirms the target before AI-assisted terminal guidance takes over. | Reported attribution |
| FP-1 Fire Point FP-1 · FP-1 drone | Fire Point (Ukraine) | Long-range one-way attack drone built by Ukrainian company Fire Point and used for strikes deep inside Russian territory, according to the Associated Press and UNITED24 Media. | Confirmed system use |
| AN-196 Liutyi Liutyi · Lyutyi · AN-196 | Ukroboronprom, Ukraine's state defense conglomerate, with Antonov also named by Forbes España and Kyiv Post | Long-range one-way attack drone with a piston engine and pusher propeller, used by Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia, with a reusable missile-carrier variant displayed in 2026. | Confirmed system use |
| P1-SUN interceptor P1-SUN · SkyFall P1-SUN | SkyFall (Ukraine) | Counter-drone interceptor that SkyFall says is built to destroy Shahed-type attack drones, with a JetKiller variant for jet-powered drones. | Reported attribution |
| Sting interceptor Sting · Wild Hornets Sting | Wild Hornets (Ukraine) | Quadcopter interceptor drone built by Ukraine's Wild Hornets to destroy Russian Shahed and Geran-type one-way attack drones in flight at a fraction of an air-defense missile's cost. | Confirmed system use |
How the evidence should be interpreted
This page maps named platforms to the conflict based on the sources below. It does not turn a manufacturer’s product page into proof of a particular battlefield event, and it does not treat every military statement as independently verified. The individual drone pages explain exactly what each source establishes.
The word “used” can mean different things: a platform may be fielded by a combatant, supplied to a combatant, identified in debris, or named in an official inventory. Those are different evidence levels, which is why this page shows the status beside every system.
Conflict timeline
2014–present; full-scale invasion from February 2022
Newest Ukrainian Drones in 2026
Four named Ukrainian long-range systems drew new reporting in 2026: SkyFall's Thor Hammer, Fire Point's FP-1, the AN-196 Liutyi and Fire Point's FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. Militarnyi reported in August 2026 that SkyFall's new strike drone flies up to 600 km with a warhead of about 50 kg, at an estimated $25,000 to $30,000 per unit. Neither that report nor Voennoe Delo's July report named the drone.
The FP-1 and the Liutyi are deep-strike drones. AP gives the FP-1 a range of up to 1,600 km and a 60 kg explosive load, at a cost of $55,000 each. Kyiv Post reports that the Liutyi normally carries a nominal 50 kg warhead, which can be increased to 75 kg. The Ukrainian long-range drones page covers both programs in more depth.
The Flamingo is a jet-powered cruise missile that Fire Point builds alongside its drones. AP reports a range of 3,000 km and a payload of 1,150 kg. The War Zone says the Flamingo's reported capabilities "align extremely closely" with an FP-5 missile offered by Milanion, a company based in the United Arab Emirates.
The War Zone adds that the relationship between the Flamingo and Milanion's FP-5 is unknown.
Two interceptors cover the defensive side. Kyiv Post describes the Wild Hornets Sting as a quadcopter that can exceed 160 km/h and reach about 3,000 m, built to hunt Shahed drones. An unnamed SkyFall representative, quoted by Defender Media, said the P1-SUN costs about $1,000 and that its top speed rose from 300 km/h to 450 km/h. Both interceptors are compared on the Ukrainian interceptor drones page.
Program hubs beyond this conflict inventory
This page lists named systems documented in the Russia–Ukraine war; it is not a full map of Russian or Iranian UAV programs.
For Russian fleet and service-name context (including Geran designations), continue on Russian drones. For Shahed-family identity across theaters, use Shahed drones.
For doctrine across conflicts rather than one theater inventory, see drone warfare. For the generic FPV role itself, cheap enough to field by the thousand and the reason both sides shifted toward fiber-optic control links, see FPV drones in war.
Ukraine war drone FAQ
What drones are documented in the Ukraine war?
Shahed-136 / Geran-2, Shahed-131 / Geran-1, Shahed-238 / Geran-3, Geran-4 / Geran-5, Mohajer-6, Bayraktar TB2, ZALA Lancet, Orlan-10, Vampire / Baba Yaga, LITAVR interceptor, Octopus interceptor, Molniya, Blyskavka, Thor Hammer, FP-1, AN-196 Liutyi, P1-SUN interceptor, Sting interceptor are the named systems in this first-release evidence set. The list is not a claim that these are the only drones present in the conflict.
How reliable is drone identification in the Ukraine war?
Reliability varies. Official releases and manufacturer records support confirmed entries; open-source and monitoring reports support reported entries. Incident-level claims need separate verification.