War drone profile · One-way attack UAV

Shahed-238 / Geran-3 Jet Attack Drone

The Shahed-238 is a jet-propelled one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) developed by Iran and known in Russian service as the Geran-3. Published speed estimates diverge by engine, from roughly 300 kilometers per hour for airframes powered by one Chinese turbojet, to 600 kilometers per hour for those fitted with a Czech TJ150 or its Iranian Tulou-10 copy. Shahed-238 and Geran-3 use is documented across the Russian campaign against Ukraine and Iranian operations in the Middle East. Documented cases include recovery of an airframe in Iraq in September 2025 and an impact in Dubai on 28 February 2026.

Shahed-238 / Geran-3 at a glance

ManufacturerShahed Aviation Industries (Iran); Russian production under the Geran-3 designation
OriginIran / Russia
CategoryOne-way attack UAV
RoleOne-way attack UAV used for long-range strike missions.
AliasesShahed-238 · Geran-3
Evidence statusReported attribution

What the public record establishes

Shahed-238 and Geran-3 use is documented across the Russian campaign against Ukraine and Iranian operations in the Middle East. Documented cases include recovery of an airframe in Iraq in September 2025 and an impact in Dubai on 28 February 2026.

The distinction between platform identity and event attribution matters. A manufacturer page can establish what a drone is; an official military release, UN report, or conflict-monitoring source is needed to establish where it appears in a war. Where those records do not align, this page keeps the uncertainty visible.

This is a non-operational reference page. It explains the manufacturer, platform family, and public conflict record without providing instructions for building, targeting, deploying, or modifying a weapon system.

Turbojet propulsion and the engine discrepancy

Turbojet propulsion separates the Shahed-238 and Geran-3 from earlier piston-driven delta-wing strike airframes. Replacing the piston engine alters flight dynamics, fuel consumption, and terminal approach speeds. According to the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the baseline Iranian Shahed-238 reportedly relies on the TJ150 turbojet produced by Czech manufacturer PBS Velká Bíteš. CSIS records that this engine installation enables speeds of approximately 600 kilometers per hour. CSIS also reports that Iran produces a domestic copy of this engine designated the Tulou-10 turbojet.

Published technical assessments disagree on the specific powerplants installed in Russian production airframes. CSIS reports that Russian-built Geran-3 drones use the Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, which produces lower speeds between 300 and 370 kilometers per hour. Separately, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) records that the Geran-3 achieves top speeds of roughly 330 kilometers per hour. Other monitoring reports reviewed by CSIS suggest certain Russian units may mount imported TJ150 engines or Iranian Tulou-10 copies to reach speeds between 550 and 600 kilometers per hour.

These technical claims cannot be reconciled into a single operating profile. The fitted engine determines actual flight parameters. Public reporting does not establish which specific powerplant configuration dominates active Russian production lines.

Where published performance figures conflict

Published flight specifications for the Shahed-238 and Geran-3 show contradictions across research institutions. Flight parameters including operational range and service ceiling vary directly with the specific engine installed in each airframe. CSIS records that the Shahed-238 operates across an estimated range between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers, reaching a maximum operational altitude of 9,000 meters. For variants fitted with the Tulou-10 or TJ150 powerplant, CSIS notes reports listing an operational range of up to 2,500 kilometers. In contrast, IISS reports that the Russian Geran-3 possesses an operational range limited to approximately 600 kilometers.

Physical dimensions and payload capacities also differ across publicly available tracking data. CSIS lists an overall fuselage length of 3.5 meters, a wingspan of 3.0 meters, and a maximum takeoff weight between 250 and 370 kilograms. CSIS records a baseline warhead payload of 50 kilograms for Iranian models, while noting that specific Russian modifications carry warheads weighing up to 90 kilograms.

Analysts at CSIS emphasize that range, speed, payload weight, and operational altitude remain strictly interdependent. An airframe configured with a heavier 90-kilogram warhead or smaller fuel tanks operates with reduced reach. Independent monitoring groups have not established a standardized baseline load across active operational units.

Design differences from the piston Shahed-136

The Shahed-238 adapts the proven delta-wing aerodynamic layout of the earlier Shahed-136 / Geran-2 to support high-speed jet flight. While the Shahed-136 relies on a rear-mounted two-stroke MD-550 piston engine that turns a pusher propeller, the Shahed-238 uses an internal turbojet with a dorsal air intake mounted on the upper fuselage. According to IISS, Russian production facilities maintained the external aerodynamic shape of the Geran-2 airframe when manufacturing the Geran-3. This structural commonality allowed assembly plants at Alabuga and Izhevsk to integrate turbojets with minimal tooling alterations on existing assembly lines.

Retaining the piston airframe structure reduced tooling delays but introduced mechanical trade-offs. IISS notes that relying on the legacy Geran-2 structure constrained performance gains, specifically capping the achievable flight velocity of early Geran-3 variants. The turbojet engine also consumes fuel at a higher rate than the piston engine on the Shahed-136. This higher fuel burn explains the sharp reduction in flight endurance noted in the 600-kilometer range estimate from IISS.

Operators seeking lower procurement costs continue to deploy piston airframes alongside jet variants. Readers tracking lighter piston systems can examine the Shahed-131 / Geran-1 profile for technical comparisons.

Guidance packages and sensor configurations

Guidance systems on the Shahed-238 vary across production batches to engage different target categories. CSIS documentation indicates that baseline airframes rely on a combination of an internal inertial navigation system (INS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation signals. To engage moving assets or positions behind front lines, Iranian developers introduced alternative nose cone sections that house optical, infrared, or active radar sensors. CSIS reports that infrared and optical packages allow operators to target thermal signatures or high-contrast ground targets in rear areas.

Specialized guidance configurations support dedicated tactical roles. CSIS notes that analysts assess radar-homing variants of the Shahed-238 as potential anti-radiation weapons designed to track defensive radar emissions during suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) operations. In addition to ground strike roles, CSIS records that the Shahed-238 is reportedly capable of intercepting aerial targets, including the MQ-9 Reaper drone.

Visual signatures also differ between daylight and night strike batches. CSIS observes that certain Shahed-238 airframes use a matte black exterior paint scheme. This finish increases the difficulty of optical detection and manual engagement during nighttime flight operations.

Launch mechanisms and ground support

Ground launch procedures for the Shahed-238 mirror the mobile deployment techniques established for earlier Iranian delta-wing drones. The aircraft does not use conventional runways for takeoff. CSIS documents three distinct operational launch configurations: accelerated automobiles, truck-mounted launch rails, and static ground platforms. Each deployment method relies on a jettisonable solid-fuel rocket booster attached beneath the rear fuselage to accelerate the airframe to flight speed before the internal turbojet sustains level cruising flight.

Rail-based mobile launchers allow launch crews to fire salvos and relocate rapidly to avoid counter-battery fire. By mounting multi-cell launch containers or open rails on commercial flatbed trucks, operating units conceal their movements within civilian vehicle traffic. The use of solid-fuel boosters provides the high initial thrust required to overcome the slow throttle response typical of small turbojet engines during ground launch.

What reporting says Russia offered to pay

Published pricing for the Shahed-238 reflects the premium associated with small turbojet engines over commercial piston powerplants. CSIS records that Shahed-238 systems cost substantially more than the piston-powered Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones. Media reports cited by CSIS indicate that Russia expressed interest in purchasing Shahed-238 airframes at reported figures between $900,000 and $1.4 million per unit, depending on the selected guidance and engine variant. CSIS explicitly cautions that these reported acquisition inquiries do not necessarily reflect the true internal manufacturing cost of producing the drone.

Production economics dictate deployment rates for one-way attack systems across large campaigns. Piston engines such as the MD-550 can be assembled from commercially sourced cast parts, whereas micro-turbojets require heat-tolerant alloys, precision balancing, and electronic fuel controllers. This manufacturing complexity limits rapid supply expansion and raises acquisition expenses. More details on family procurement trends appear on the Shahed drones overview page.

Documented operational history and field recoveries

Documented combat deployment of the Shahed-238 began following its formal public unveiling in late 2023. The Iranian Ashura Aerospace University of Science & Technology first revealed the Shahed-238 in Iran during an official exhibition attended by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. According to CSIS, Iran offered in 2023 to supply the Russian military with approximately 100 Shahed-238 units per month. By February 2025, Russian defense industry facilities initiated domestic production under the Geran-3 designation. In July 2025, Russian units conducted a coordinated saturation strike launching 300 Geran airframes against Kyiv.

Middle Eastern theaters have yielded additional documented recoveries of the system. CSIS reports that Iraqi security authorities recovered an intact Shahed-238 in Basra province in September 2025, which local sources assessed was conducting a reconnaissance flight along the Iran-Iraq border. During Operation True Promise IV, Iranian armed forces launched thousands of one-way attack drones, including Shahed-238 units, in a retaliatory bombardment intended to shorten warning times and complicate air-defense engagement cycles. On 28 February 2026, an individual Shahed-238 struck a forecourt area in front of a hotel in Dubai.

Ukrainian tracking records show an expansion of Russian jet drone usage over the course of 2026. A report published by Militarnyi quotes Yurii Cherevashchenko, deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, stating that jet-powered airframes represented 15% to 20% of all Russian Shahed launches as early as April 2026. Militarnyi records that Russian forces launched 1,400 jet drones by early June 2026, compared to 180 total jet launches throughout 2025.

Where the Geran-3 sits in the family

Russian design teams followed the Geran-3 with the Geran-4 and Geran-5, which drop the converted piston airframe for purpose-built high-speed shapes. Technical specifications for those successors are on the Geran-4 / Geran-5 profile.

The wider family record sits on the Shahed drones hub, with the piston variants profiled separately as Shahed-136 / Geran-2 and Shahed-131 / Geran-1. Programme-level coverage runs through Iranian drones and Russian drones.

Wars covered

Shahed-238 / Geran-3 FAQ

Who makes the Shahed-238 / Geran-3?

Shahed Aviation Industries (Iran); Russian production under the Geran-3 designation

Where has the Shahed-238 / Geran-3 been documented?

Russia–Ukraine War; 2026 Iran War

Is the Shahed-238 / Geran-3 identification fully confirmed?

Reported attribution. This status applies to the level of evidence described on this page, not to every individual battlefield claim.

Primary and monitoring sources

JV

An editor's note on method. Every full article carries a named author, uses filings and primary sources instead of aggregators, and is dated on publication. Informational only — not investment advice · We hold no positions.Read our method →

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