War drone profile · One-way attack UAV

Geran-4 and Geran-5 Jet-Powered Drones

The Geran-4 and Geran-5 are Russia’s newest jet-powered one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukrainian intelligence documents put the Geran-5 on a 200-kilogram-thrust Chinese turbojet, at 600 km/h with a 950-kilometre range, and carrying the Geran-2’s 90-kilogram warhead. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) documented the first Geran-5 debris on 11 January 2026 in the Ukraine-Russia war. Ukrainian defence intelligence figures published in August 2026 put Russian monthly output of the two types at roughly 3,000 units.

Geran-4 / Geran-5 at a glance

ManufacturerRussian production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Tatarstan; engines identified by Ukrainian intelligence as Chinese
OriginRussia / China
CategoryOne-way attack UAV
RoleJet-powered one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems designed for deep strikes and high-speed penetration against air-defense networks.
AliasesGeran-4 · Geran-5
Evidence statusReported attribution

What the public record establishes

Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) documented the first Geran-5 debris on 11 January 2026 in the Ukraine-Russia war. Ukrainian defence intelligence figures published in August 2026 put Russian monthly output of the two types at roughly 3,000 units.

The distinction between platform identity and event attribution matters. A manufacturer page can establish what a drone is; an official military release, UN report, or conflict-monitoring source is needed to establish where it appears in a war. Where those records do not align, this page keeps the uncertainty visible.

This is a non-operational reference page. It explains the manufacturer, platform family, and public conflict record without providing instructions for building, targeting, deploying, or modifying a weapon system.

Structural departure from the Shahed airframe in the Geran-5

The Geran-5 is the first Russian long-range strike drone to abandon the triangular flying-wing geometry of earlier Iranian imports. Since late 2022, Russian deep-strike operations relied on the cranked-delta planform of the Shahed-136 / Geran-2. In contrast, the Geran-5 introduces an elongated, cylindrical fuselage resembling a conventional cruise missile.

Ukrainian military intelligence documented the physical layout of the Geran-5 after recovering impact debris on 11 January 2026. GUR records indicate that the fuselage measures about 6 metres in length, with an estimated wingspan reaching up to 5.5 metres across mid-mounted flight surfaces. That elongated airframe accommodates a dedicated dorsal air intake and an internal turbojet housing.

Debris examinations showed that the Geran-5 retains certain internal subcomponents from older Geran-2 airframes. Fabian Hinz at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that internal brackets, wiring conduits, and flight control modules share mountings with the piston-engine model. This shared internal architecture lets Russian assembly plants produce the new aerodynamic shell without redesigning every internal electronics rack.

Reported performance metrics for the Geran-5 and Geran-4

Technical documents released by GUR establish distinct operational envelopes for Russia's two new turbojet strike variants. The Ukrainian intelligence files state that the Geran-5 uses a 200-kilogram-thrust turbojet engine identified as Chinese in origin. Those records give the Geran-5 a maximum range of 950 kilometres and a top speed of 600 km/h. It carries the same 90-kilogram warhead.

The Geran-4 uses a different aerodynamic layout characterized by a shorter nose section configured for high-speed transit. Ukrainian intelligence puts the Geran-4 at up to 500 km/h. Its reported range reaches 850 kilometres. IISS reports the Geran-4's engine produces more thrust than the Geran-3's.

The Geran-5 turns its extra thrust into both a higher top speed and a longer range than the Geran-3. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) gives the baseline Geran-3 / Shahed-238 a Chinese Telefly JT80 engine delivering 300 to 370 km/h. IISS puts the Geran-3's range at up to 600 kilometres. CSIS also noted reporting that Czech TJ150 or Iranian Tulou-10 engines reach 550 to 600 km/h. The difference is that the Geran-5 holds that top speed across a longer 950-kilometre flight profile.

Interceptor evasion and altitude advantages

At 500 to 600 km/h these drones outrun the propeller-driven interceptors defending Ukrainian airspace. IISS reported that Ukraine's current interceptor UAV fleet operates at flight speeds between 200 and 300 km/h.

Ukrainian formations receive up to 1,500 counter-UAV interceptor drones a day. These interceptors provide an economical counter against piston-driven Shahed models cruising below 200 km/h. Mobile ground teams can no longer rely on low-speed interceptor drones and must expend guided surface-to-air missiles instead.

Turbojet power plants also allow the Geran-4 and Geran-5 to cruise at higher altitudes along ingress routes. IISS observed that higher operating altitudes make drones simpler to track on long-range radar installations. Intercepting a high-altitude target needs heavier missile batteries. Those cost far more to field than mobile gun trucks, as the counter-unmanned aircraft systems (counter-UAS) record sets out.

Documented gaps in public evidence

Every published technical specification for the Geran-4 and Geran-5 originates from Ukrainian intelligence assessments rather than factory documentation. No Russian manufacturer, defence ministry briefing, or independent technical lab has released engineering records for either drone. Western research institutions and defense media rely entirely on documents and debris cataloged by GUR.

Public sources present conflicting accounts regarding the developmental stage of the Geran-4. In January 2026, IISS reported that the Geran-4 remained under development alongside active field testing of the Geran-5. By August 2026, Ukrainian intelligence statements published by Militarnyi indicated that serial production of the Geran-4 was already active at a plant in Tatarstan.

Verification gaps also persist regarding propulsion sourcing and unit production costs. GUR identified the Geran-5 turbojet as a Chinese-manufactured 200-kilogram-thrust model, but intelligence files name no commercial manufacturer or part number. Furthermore, no verified unit purchase price or manufacturing cost has been published for either variant. Economic comparisons remain unverified as a result.

Assembly lines and monthly output figures

Russian industrial facilities reorganized manufacturing capacity in early 2026 to prioritize jet-powered one-way attack drones over piston models. Militarnyi published Ukrainian defence intelligence figures for August 2026. Russian factories were then building about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month. In that same month, monthly output of conventional piston-engine Geran-2 drones dropped to approximately 2,800 units.

Both types are built at a plant in Yelabuga, inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. CSIS estimated in March 2026 that overall Russian drone manufacturing stood at roughly 5,500 units per month across all variants. Separate from the Alabuga complex, the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol manufactures the Garpyia series of Shahed-pattern drones on a distinct production line.

Combat tracking from the Ukrainian Air Force illustrates how quickly jet drones expanded within Russian strike salvos. Ukrainian Air Force deputy commander Yurii Cherevashchenko put jet-powered drones at 15 to 20 percent of Russian Shahed deployments as early as April 2026. Air Force communications head Yurii Ihnat reported a fivefold jump in jet drone launches between June and July 2026, up to two-thirds of certain strike salvos.

Air launch trials and air-to-air missile integration

Russian military planners are conducting trials to launch the Geran-4 and Geran-5 from Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack jets. Releasing a drone from an airborne Su-25 combines the operational radius of the aircraft with the drone's range of 850 to 950 kilometres. That pairing widens the target set a Russian planner can reach. It also gives the Su-25 a standoff task in place of the close air support Ukraine's contested environment has degraded.

Russian forces are also evaluating air-to-air missile carriage to convert these jet drones into active threats against intercepting aircraft. Intelligence reports reviewed by IISS indicate that Russia is exploring outfitting the Geran-4 and Geran-5 with Vympel R-73 infrared-guided missiles. Ukraine documented experimental Geran-2 drones fitted with Vympel R-60 missiles or Verba man-portable air-defence systems. Ukrainian units recently reported shooting down a Geran-4 carrying an R-60 weapon.

Employing air-to-air weaponry requires onboard targeting datalinks, which Russia provides by installing mesh network hardware on its jet drones. Examination of recovered Geran-5 wreckage revealed communication gear matching the mesh-network transceivers found on loitering Geran-2 variants. The datalinks let drones relay sensor data across a formation. The same datalinks let them engage aerial targets, a pattern the loitering munitions record traces.

Evaluating Iranian design lineage for the Geran-5

Structural features of the Geran-5 airframe generated immediate debate regarding whether the configuration originated in Iranian design bureaus. Following the initial debris recovery in January 2026, GUR highlighted visual similarities between the Geran-5 and the Iranian Karrar uncrewed jet. Ukrainian intelligence explicitly suggested that the Geran-5 could be a direct license or derivative of an undisclosed Iranian design.

IISS analysts compared the recovered Geran-5 airframe directly against known configurations of the Iranian Karrar. Both use a cruise-missile shape with straight wings. IISS found they differ substantially in engine placement, structural dimensions, and fabrication materials. However, because Iranian manufacturers frequently build military UAV variants without public disclosure, IISS concluded that Iranian involvement cannot be ruled out completely.

Defense specialists at IISS frame the Geran-5 within an expanding global trend toward low-cost cruise missile systems. These weapons borrow the shape and cruising speed of a cruise missile. They leave out the costly parts: radar altimeters, composite stealth coatings, and complex turbofans. The result is a high-speed strike munition produced at industrial scales far exceeding the output of traditional cruise missile assembly plants.

Lineage across the Geran family

The Geran-4 and Geran-5 mark the third generation of Russian long-range one-way attack uncrewed aircraft. The first generation focused on domestic manufacturing of the piston-driven Shahed-136 / Geran-2 at Alabuga. Russian engineers introduced domestic composites, more resilient satellite navigation antennas, and mesh-networking loitering capabilities while maintaining the baseline delta airframe.

The second generation added jet propulsion to that same delta flying wing, producing the Geran-3 / Shahed-238. Although the Geran-3 raised flight speeds above 300 km/h, the thick delta profile created excessive aerodynamic drag at higher velocities. Developing the Geran-4 and Geran-5 allowed Russian designers to surpass those speed barriers by adopting dedicated high-speed airframes, as the Russian drones record documents.

Major General Vadym Skibitsky of GUR stated that Russia reduced overall strike volumes in July 2026 to retool assembly lines for turbojet production. Defense analysts can monitor ongoing recovery reports and technical breakdowns via the Shahed drones archive to track how Russian forces deploy the Geran-5 in long-range strike operations.

Wars covered

Geran-4 / Geran-5 FAQ

Who makes the Geran-4 / Geran-5?

Russian production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Tatarstan; engines identified by Ukrainian intelligence as Chinese

Where has the Geran-4 / Geran-5 been documented?

Russia–Ukraine War

Is the Geran-4 / Geran-5 identification fully confirmed?

Reported attribution. This status applies to the level of evidence described on this page, not to every individual battlefield claim.

Primary and monitoring sources

JV

An editor's note on method. Every full article carries a named author, uses filings and primary sources instead of aggregators, and is dated on publication. Informational only — not investment advice · We hold no positions.Read our method →

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