Samad-3

Samad-3 is a Houthi-designated UAV family associated with long-range attacks and a mixed local and external supply chain.

Samad-3 at a glance

What the public record establishes

UN Yemen Panel reporting describes inspected Samad-3 engines and identifies Samad-type UAVs in Houthi operations. The Panel separates inspected components from attack-specific claims, so this page labels attribution reported rather than confirmed for individual Red Sea incidents.

The distinction between platform identity and event attribution matters. A manufacturer page can establish what a drone is; an official military release, UN report, or conflict-monitoring source is needed to establish where it appears in a war. Where those records do not align, this page keeps the uncertainty visible.

This is a non-operational reference page. It explains the manufacturer, platform family, and public conflict record without providing instructions for building, targeting, deploying, or modifying a weapon system.

The Samad Family: Samad-1, Samad-2 and Samad-3

The Houthi-operated Samad drone family comprises three distinct airframe iterations that scale up from short-range tactical reconnaissance to long-range strike. The Samad-1 serves as a surveillance and reconnaissance platform, while the larger Samad-2 and Samad-3 carry an 18 kg explosive warhead for one-way attack missions.

The primary physical distinction between the two attack models is a dorsal fuel tank fitted along the top of the fuselage on the Samad-3. That extra capacity increases total fuel volume from 21 liters to 47.3 liters and pushes the Samad-3 range far beyond that of the baseline Samad-2.

The United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen documented the airframe in its January 2019 report (S/2019/83). The Panel inspected five recovered airframes with V-shaped tail fins and rear pusher propellers, designating the type "UAV-X" and noting that it might correspond to the Samad-2 and Samad-3 names used in Houthi-affiliated media.

In an attack role, the UAV-X carried 18 kg of explosives mixed with ball bearings, while reconnaissance variants carried a Nikon D810 commercial camera. The Panel attributed its performance figures to the engine manufacturer's estimate for the German 3W110i B2 and Chinese DLE 170 engines.

On that basis, the UAV-X reaches 200 to 250 km/h and may have a maximum range of 1,200 to 1,500 km, depending on wind conditions.

Aerodynamic performance modeling published by Voskuijl, Dekkers, and Savelsberg in Science & Global Security provided more detailed flight calculations for each variant. For the Samad-1, the authors calculated a crude range estimate of roughly 460 km assuming a 10 kg reconnaissance payload, which corresponds with a 500 km flight claim broadcast in Houthi media.

For the Samad-2, their aerodynamic models projected a median operational range between 887 km and 989 km, leading the authors to conclude that the baseline Samad-2 was unlikely to reach strategic targets across Saudi Arabia from Houthi-held territory. The Samad-3, carrying 35.7 kg of fuel at a maximum takeoff weight of 107.4 kg, yielded a modeled median range of 1,831 km to 2,101 km.

Subsequent field inspections confirmed regular operational deployment of the extended-range airframes. In its November 2023 report (S/2023/833), the UN Panel documented DLE 170 engines recovered from Samad-3 debris following attacks in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, alongside a customs seizure of DLE170-type engines at the Shahn border crossing in December 2022.

The Panel also counted eight Samad-2 and six Samad-3 attack drones during a September 2022 military parade in Sana'a. Before mid-2018, the UN Panel noted, Houthi loitering-munition reach was limited by the Qasef-1's 150 km maximum range. Samad-type drones extended that reach to targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the wider Yemen and Red Sea conflict.

For the shorter-range Houthi system, see the Qasef-2K profile. Samad range figures circulating outside these UN Panel reports and the Science & Global Security paper are unverified secondary claims, not manufacturer specifications.

Who is reported to build and operate Samad-3

No publicly traded company is tied to Samad-3 production. UN Yemen Panel reporting and the CENTCOM Red Sea release both describe a Houthi-operated system with alleged Iranian material support, not a disclosed commercial manufacturer or contract.

For program-level context on the broader Iranian-linked supply chain that reporting references, see Iran drones. For how this site treats unit-cost claims when no manufacturer price is public, see military drone cost.

How Samad-3 fits among named Houthi and regional systems

Within the Houthi inventory, Samad-3 is documented as the longer-range one-way attack and reconnaissance system, distinct from the shorter-range Qasef-2K profile on this site.

For the wider Iranian-linked one-way-attack lineage this reporting references, see the Shahed drones family hub. For how one-way attack is defined against other UAV categories, see types of military drones, and for the regional conflict picture beyond Yemen, see Middle East drones.

Wars covered

• Yemen and Red Sea Conflict — 2015–present; maritime escalation from late 2023